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Summary 
In this paper we discuss changes in regulation and governance in primary and lower 
secondary education in Norway, Sweden and England. During the last ten–fifteen years 
the three countries have implemented reforms, which seem to imply new governing 
principles and tools. The paper aims to examine important reforms in the three 
countries and start developing an analytical framework for further exploration. Firstly, 
we classify the policy changes taken place in the three countries, by highlighting 
similarities and differences in their regulative educational policies. Secondly, we discuss 
to what degree the choice of policy-tools represents a move towards increased 
convergence across the countries. Making comparisons while using the concept of tools 
as the primary analytical tool, implicates a potential danger for stressing convergence on 
behalf of divergence. The use of a tool doesn’t tell us how it is implemented in practice 
or in which institutional context the tool operates. If we want to explain policy changes 
and how they are implemented we need to broaden our analytical perspective. The 
discussion demonstrates that which tools are chosen and how they are implemented are 
affected by the established historical institutional context within the different 
educational systems. All the same, the dynamics of change implicate breakdown of the 
traditional hierarchical governing structures. Accordingly, the term of governance with 
its focus on governing relations is a useful contribution to studies of policy changes.  
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Sammendrag 
I notatet drøftes endringer i regulering og styring av grunnskolen som følge av reformer 
på 1990-tallet i Norge, Sverige og England. Alle land har i denne perioden gjennomført 
reformer som ser ut til å innebære nye prinsipper for politisk–administrativ styring. I 
tillegg er notatet et forsøk på å utvikle et analytisk rammeverk for sammenligning av 
reformer og praksis mellom land. Gjennom å klassifisere reformene i hvert land etter et 
analyseskjema basert på hvilken type policy instrument hvert land har valgt har formålet 
vært å diskutere konvergens versus divergens mellom landene. Analysen viser at 
reformene peker mot en re-orientering i alle land i retning av deregulering, de-
sentralisering, konkurranse og resultatevaluering. Tiltross for konvergens i valg av 
policyinstrumenter er det grunn til å stille spørsmål ved likhet på andre nivåer i de tre 
land. Valg av samme instrument fører ikke til likt utfall i landene, ei heller sier det lite 
om hvordan det blir iverksatt samt om den historisk–institusjonell kontekst det virker 
innenfor. I en diskusjon om likheter og forskjeller er det viktig å understreke 
begrensningene ved ensidig å fokusere på styringsinstrumenter. Både den innbyrdes 
spenningen som oppstår mellom inkonsistente policyinstrumenter, den historiske–
institusjonelle konteksten og studier av praksisfeltet er viktig for å forstå den faktiske 
iverksettingen av skolereformer i hvert land. Samtidig vil et bredere analyseskjema sikre 
en fra å dra forhastede slutninger om konvergens. Valg av policy instrumenter er preget 
av etablerte institusjonelle faktorer. Samtidig representerer 1990 tallets reformer en 
endringsdynamikk som impliserer nedbryting av tradisjonelle hierarkiske strukturer. 
Dermed må de fremvoksende relasjonene og innflytelsesmønstrene integreres i studier 
av policy endringer. 
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Introduction 
Throughout various parts of the world there have, in recent decades, been an increasing 
number of attempts to restructure and deregulate state schooling. In the core of these 
initiatives are efforts to dismantle centralized educational bureaucracies and to create 
devolved systems of education, which entail institutional autonomy and school based 
management and administration (Whitty et al 1998). In this paper we discuss some 
changes in regulation and governance in the educational sector in Norway, Sweden and 
England. During the last ten years the three countries have implemented reforms, which 
seem to imply new governing principles and tools. In turn, these new principles may 
affect the division of responsibility between the different levels of authority and 
between different groups of actors influencing the particular policy area. Increasingly, 
the overall aim of school policy seems to be an ambiguous one in all of these countries: 
On the one hand, there is a tendency to give more autonomy to the local level in 
decentralising tasks and responsibilities to the municipalities and the schools. On the 
other hand, an opposite tendency is the central authority’s intensification in developing 
tools for controlling schools activities. However, the ambiguities take different shapes in 
the three countries. Norway and Sweden belong to the same social democratic welfare 
state model, and have many economic, cultural, social and political traits in common 
(Esping Andersen 1990). Also, they share a range of characteristics in the educational 
system, such as the impact of the comprehensive school and the value of equality. 
Despite these similarities, changes in the educational system, especially in the 1990s have 
been proceeding quite differently. Sweden has placed a distinct emphasis on transferring 
powers to the municipal level (Hudson and Lidström 2002). Apparently, Norway has 
adopted the international pattern of stressing freedom of organizational forms over 
efforts to influence policy contents (Amnå 2000), although this could be an indirect path 
to power in the school system (Helgøy 2003, Helgøy and Homme 2003). Great Britain 
belongs to a different welfare state model, i.e. the liberal one (Esping-Andersen 1990), 
and compared to the two Scandinavian countries the traditions in education policy are 
different.  
This paper is based on a comparative research project in its initial phase, and aims to 
examine important reforms in the three countries and start developing an analytical 
framework for further exploration. Firstly, we aim to classify the policy changes taken 
place in the three countries, by highlighting similarities and differences in their regulative 
educational policies. Secondly, we discuss to what degree the choice of policy-tools 
represents a move towards increased convergence across the countries. Thirdly, we 
point to a need for encompassing both policy tools, institutional context and the level of 
practises in analysing changes in policy outputs. 
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Theoretical approach  
The changes in governing tools in the education sector raise questions of efficiency and 
legitimacy. The assumption underlying our theoretical approach is that fundamentally, 
choice of (educational) tools is a political decision and not merely a technical one. The 
choice of tools influences which actors that will be part of the implementation process 
and accordingly which actors structuring action. Consequently, whatever choice of 
adequate tools, it advantages some actors – with their own perspectives, interests, skills 
and incentives – at the expense of others in determining how policies are carried out. 
This approach implies a broadening of the analytical focus from merely internal 
hierarchic agencies to also include organizational networks. A wide array of complex 
exchanges come into existence between government agencies and a variety of public 
and private institutions participating in the operation of the public reforms (Salamon 
2002). This can be conceptualized as governance. According to Kooiman (1993) 
governance is widely defined as patterns emerging from governing activities of social, 
political and administrative actors. The focus is on governing relations rather than merely 
on hierarchical–administrative structures. Empirically such governing relations can be 
observed as self-organizing, inter-organizational networks (Rhodes 1997). The 
perspective of governance captures patterns of authorities and relations that are not 
considered as part of the formal hierarchical institutions but that are distinct to each 
specific policy arena. 
Our point of departure in developing the analytical framework is Ingram and 
Schneider’s categorical scheme of policy instruments (Ingram and Schneider 1990). The 
categories seem useful in capturing the dimensions of the policy area we are studying. In 
addition, we are inspired by a study of higher education in the same three countries 
which has fruitfully applied the same analytical scheme (Bleiklie 1999, 2000). 
Pol icy  instruments  
According to Ingram and Schneider, an important feature of public policy is the attempt 
to get people to behave different from what they otherwise would prefer to do.  In this 
respect, five different categories of tools are seen as central. Authority tools, include 
legislation and reorganization of formal organizational framework, building upon the 
assumption that agents and targets are responsible to the organisational structure of 
leader–follower relationship. Legitimate governments’ authority grants permission and 
prohibits or requires action under designated circumstances. Central dimensions within 
this category are that of centralization versus decentralization of formal decision making 
power and that of forms and degrees of systemic integration within a political system 
(Bleiklie 1999). Incentive tools are instruments relying on positive or negative tangible 
payoffs to induce compliance or to encourage utilization. These tools are based on the 
assumption that individual  behaviour is motivated by maximising utility, and thereby to 
be encouraged or coerced by manipulation of different sorts of material or non-material 
incentives. Capacity tools rely on information, training, education and resources provided 
to enable individuals, groups or agencies to make decisions or to take actions. Symbolic 
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and hortatory tools assume that individual’s beliefs and values, such as justice, 
individualism, equality and obligations motivate policy-related action. Thus target 
population are more likely to comply with behaviour desirable from a policy perspective 
if the behaviour is consistent with their own beliefs. Learning tools are set in when the 
basis for the problem solving action is uncertain or unknown. The idea is that agencies 
and target populations can learn about their behaviour and thereby select effective tools 
from other tools. Bleiklie (2000) holds evaluation as a common tool gaining acceptance 
the recent years. At the same time evaluation may be used as an authority tool, either as 
a standardization instrument or in order to effectively distribute incentives. Widely 
defined, evaluation includes performance measuring, testing and output control that is 
of great significance for this particular policy area.  
We will try to characterize the policy changes in primary and secondary education in 
the three countries due to the categories of policy instruments introduced by Ingram 
and Schneider. The categorization below must be considered as a suggestion and we 
also want to point that some policy tools can respond to more than one of the five 
broad categories of policy instruments. 
The Norwegian Case 
Author i ty  tools  
Historically, legislation and formal structure have been the most evident and prominent 
forms of control in the Norwegian school system. Although historically the 
responsibility for schools in Norway has been divided between municipalities and the 
state, the Norwegian system is a typical example of a centralized educational 
bureaucracy. Schools have been parts of a strongly specialized organizational structure, a 
typical sector organisation with strong connections from the municipal bottom to the 
state on the hierarchical top. The authority levels were tightly interwoven which meant 
strong relations and collaboration between the principal of schools, the municipals 
school administration, the regional authority and the ministry (Farsund 1998, Telhaug 
1997). More or less detailed, the school legislation acts have regulated teachers’ 
employment conditions, their education, as well as organisation and content of this 
education by a national curriculum. 
The Norwegian school system is characterised by a combination of strongly 
regulating national curriculum and legislation, a realisation of the unitary school and a 
national and standardized teacher’s education. However, this particular and strong 
formal control has not meant lack of professional autonomy.  The prevalence of 
administrative control over substance in schools activities has provided extensive trust 
and autonomy for the teachers. Moreover, the Norwegian model has included 
cooperation between professional and political actors. Until the 1990s the formal 
organisation gave the professions several channels for influence: through consultative 
systems, through their participation in non-ministerial councils committees, through 
their positions in municipal and central educational administration and through their 
participation in parliamentary committees. This decision making system gave teachers 
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influence in law preparations, the planning of the curriculum and assessment of the 
experimental and development activities in schools.  
The formal structure and the detail oriented legislation remain stable until late 1980s. 
However, reforms during the 1990s redirected the use of authority tools. A White paper 
(St.meld. nr. 37 (1990–91)) formulated the political intention to introduce a national 
political consistent steering model.    
The education reforms were initiated and implemented during a Labour party 
government period from 1990 to 1997, followed by a centre parties/conservative party 
coalition government period from 1997 until now, only disrupted by a short labour 
government period from 2000 until the election autumn 2001. The changes have taken 
place under two different governments. The labour party government started by 
introducing the Education reforms in 1997. Under the leadership of the minister of 
education representing the conservative party, Kristin Clemet, several regulations in the 
education policy have been introduced. As will be stated later, she makes use of other 
forms of tools than did the former government. 
Incremental shifts in the Norwegian education policy from 1986 encompassing both 
the administrative structures, curriculum and teaching reforms. The Block Grant Act of 
1986 changed the public service finance system radically from state determined 
earmarked allocation to municipality decided priorities. The Municipality/local 
government Act of 1992 gave the municipalities autonomy to organize their services, 
including primary and lower secondary school. The trend is to reduce the local 
education authorities to a minimum. Accordingly, schools suffer from a lack of 
coordination. On the other side schools are given institutional autonomy. The head 
teacher has increased autonomy over budgeting, recruiting, the organisation of 
education and pedagogical development.  
The 1997 Education Reform/The 1999 Education Act aimed to transform not just school 
policy and curriculum for primary and lower secondary school, but also to connect the 
schools more closely with kindergartens, and local cultural life. Another distinctive 
feature of the National Curriculum, L97, was the changed status from recommendations 
to formal regulations. The curriculum has been characterised as the most detailed and 
regulated ever (Gundem and Karseth 1998, Broadhead 2001). The school reform also 
included an expansion of and the compulsory education from 9 to 10 years.  
Primarily, private schools are regarded as supplements to local authority schools. 
Approximately 98.4 per cent of children at primary and lower secondary levels (and 96 
per cent of upper secondary school pupils) attend schools administered by the local 
authorities (http://odin.dep.no/filarkiv/176297/utdan.eng.q.pdf).Most 
private schools are administered by religious denominations or by organizations 
representing specific views of life or alternative educational approaches. Authorized 
private schools receive financial support from the State. A new independent school Act 
of 2003 intend to make it easier to establish private schools. 
In addition to changes in legislation the 1990s brought changes in the political–
administrative decision making system: the non-ministerial professional councils were 
abolished. Moreover, the Ministry took control over some of their tasks; other tasks 
were taken over by the new administrative coordination body: The Centre for Learning 
(Læringssenteret). By this change the corporative influence was reduced. The planning 
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of the next curriculum proved this statement. The curriculum was taken care of by the 
Ministry and other kinds of expertise and actors outside education were invited to 
participate in the preparation process. The school has been more integrated in the 
municipal government. Municipalities have been legally obliged to provide day-care 
facilities before and after school hours for children attending the first four grades. 
Parents have been assigned a greater influence through school boards and committees, 
and as a body entitled to comment, both locally and nationally 
Incent ive tools   
The strong and formal regulated school system in Norway in addition to the strong 
tradition of employment security and equal wage system have not prepared for use of 
incentive tools. However, to some extent the new legislation has loosened up the 
restricted wage system. Teachers negotiating rights have changed. While the Norwegian 
teachers have been employed by the municipalities, they have been negotiating with the 
state. Currently, the municipalities have full employment responsibility. To some extent 
the individual head teacher has the right to use wage as recruitment and reward tool, 
accordingly the long tradition of equality is broken. The beginning of wage 
differentiation is promoted against the policy of the teacher union. The differentiations 
have different sources, one of them performance based. The performance pay system 
has brought huge oppositions from the teachers’ employers’ organisation. Their main 
argument is that a performance pay system is based on uncertain and diffuse criteria due 
to the fact that teachers’ performance is difficult to measure.  Another form of incentive 
is brought into school through a bonus scheme. Schools which perform well, due to 
several central set standards, receive financial rewards. The scheme is supposed to 
stimulate for pedagogical development and to strengthen the institutions own sense of 
responsibility. However, this specific incentive tool is limited and currently it is only of 
minor importance. Another, also limited, incentive tool is represented by per capita 
funding which has been introduced in a small number of municipalities. Standing alone, 
this tool will be of symbolic character. Combined with open enrolments in school, 
however, the tool will be of increasingly importance.    
Capaci ty  tools  
Resource allocation is a central capacity tool in Norway, as in other educational systems. 
Since its origin the state schooling system has gained broad political support, and 
represent together with the health sector, an area where a great deal of resource 
allocation are accepted and legitimated by the population. Norway is among the 
countries spending most recourses per pupil in primary and lower secondary education. 
Recourses per pupil seem stable during the last decade. The same pattern emerges when 
it comes to teachers per pupil.  Averagely Norway has 11 pupils per teacher, ranking 
number four among selected OECD countries (OECD 2003). The relative high 
spending of resources in Norway is to be explained both by the scattered settlement and 
by the teacher density index. The tradition of local schools as «the heart of the local 
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community» combined with scattered settlement in a spacious country lead to more 
resources per pupil in the rural areas than in the urban areas. Anyhow, the predictable 
flow of resources combined with minimal insight in schools activities might have 
supported the capacity of teachers/head teachers as decision makers at the institutional 
level. Another kind of capacity tool has been the teachers’ education and professional 
monopoly of positions in school. Worth to mention is also the tradition of school-
developments measures and experimental activities supported by the Central Agency of 
Experimental activities established 1954 and laid down in 1986. Experimental activities 
were to a great extent initiated and carried out locally. This in turn implied an 
opportunity to improve the capacity of influence in the general schools policy, because 
many former experiments have been transformed into general education policy.   
In the current situation contemporary capacity tools are undergoing reformulations. 
Head teachers have been responsible for the schools own budget, but municipalities’ 
increased responsibilities on  employment, organising and drifting schools make the 
financial support  less predictable  In addition, the messages from the authorities, as 
formulated in policy documents  throughout the 1990s is for the schools to provide 
more education of better quality for the resources set in. The extensive amount of 
resources allocated to the education sector is being questioned among others because 
the Norwegian score at the PISA tests so far is quite middle range. Thereby, according 
to the educational authorities, these scorings are not reflecting the resources spent. The 
signals sent out could mean that the capacity tools now are being concentrated more on 
output control and quality improvement due to an instrumental, rather than a 
professional, logic. A White Paper from 2004 (St.meld. nr. 30 (2003–2004)) clearly 
focuses on improving capacities at  the local level. «Competence» is the key word in the 
suggestion of restructuring teachers’ education. At the same time the frames for the 
capacity improving may restrict the traditional professional influence on core decisions.     
Another ongoing change is the entry of new occupation groups in school. Pre-school 
teachers as well as social workers, nurses and different categories of unskilled assistants 
have – to a certain degree - been employed in school, creating a new professional system 
which until the mid 90s only involved teachers. In addition the new Independent school 
Act of 2003 has made it easier to establish independent schools. 
Symbol ic  and hortatory  tools  
Schools are institutions with long traditions and a history distinguished by values and 
norms defining what the school is about, what it shall do and who to do it. Traditionally 
the school was supposed to provide not only education, but also leaving the pupils with 
a general sense of decorum. Other core values have been equality and uniformity. Those 
values are now being challenged by instrumentalist values. The objectives of the policy 
are formulated in a terminology stressing effectiveness and measurable results and 
products.   
Moreover, in line with a productive way of thinking, the relations between the actors 
are changing too. This is materialized, among others, in a new teacher and pupil role and 
new forms of class room activities. New methods of teaching make pupils’ more self-
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activated and responsible for their own learning. Even though we don’t know the 
penetrating power of these methods, implying individualization and pupils self 
evaluation, they may reflect goal orientation and productivity as new values imbuing 
schools. 
Although open enrolment still is in the initial phase, rhetorically the value of 
consumerism is being brought into education policy. At the administrative level head 
teachers are defined as leaders of a service unit, while parents/pupils are defined as 
consumers. Also, it has become common for municipalities to perform consumer 
evaluations every year.   
Learning tools   
The introduction of evaluation activities are among the main changes in policy tools.  
The notion legitimating the increased stress on evaluation is that the Norwegian 
educational authorities are without adequate information on the activities taking place at 
the school level. Consequently, the authorities have been unable to learn from 
experience and to improve education. The first initiatives to design a system for 
evaluation were taken early in the 1990s. The concept of «Management by objectives 
and results» was introduced. Centrally formulations of objectives, counselling, reporting 
and evaluating results are key elements in this regulating model. However, teachers 
expressed massive resistance to the evaluation. The teachers saw the evaluation system 
as a threat to their professional freedom. At first, the evaluation intentions were 
transformed into a sort of self-evaluation in school. Information was reported neither to 
municipalities nor to the Ministry.  
However, due to the latest learning tools we are observing changes that may imply a 
shift from a collaborative line to a confronting one.  Systems for how to report and 
publish performance tables for leaving examinations’ in lower secondary school have 
been introduced. Independent schools are ranged on the top of the performance tables. 
Currently, a debate is going on in the media concerning the credibility of independent 
schools. They are accused of manipulating the criteria’s for giving marks in order to 
strengthen their market position. According to a national evaluation, 40 per cent of the 
private schools are breaking the independent school act by excluding pupils with special 
needs and extended use of unskilled teachers. In addition, the Secretary of Education is 
introducing national testing at four stages in primary and lower secondary school. The 
results will be published online. Other criteria for evaluating quality in school are being 
discussed.    
The Swedish case 
Author i ty  tools  
Norway and Sweden share similarities due to the uniform formal structure but the two 
countries do have different traditions when it comes to the position of the local and 
WORKING PAPER  17  –  2004 GOVERNANCE  IN  PRIMARY  AND LOWER SECONDARY  EDUCAT ION 
 14
central authorities. In Sweden the centrality was even more extensive than in Norway. 
This is due to the detailed legislation and curriculum in combination with the strong 
position of the educational administrative body, the National Board of Education 
(Skolöverstyrelsen), established in 1920 and maintained until 1990. In a Commission 
Report the Swedish educational structure was described as «the centralization is carried 
through almost 100 per cent» (SOU 1973:48). That meant that decisions about details 
such as location of schools, recruiting and engagement of teachers, organisations of the 
education and so on were taken by the National Board according to the detailed 
legislation and regulations. Additionally, even though the local authorities were 
established in the 1950’s their influence was limited. The National Board of Education 
represented an effective, coordinated and uniform bureaucracy.    
However, the strong status of the central authorities does not necessarily imply total 
insight and overview over schools activities. Rather they were criticised of not knowing 
what happened in schools and how the curriculum was implemented. Like in Norway, 
the control was concentrated on administrative issues which in turn might have given 
teachers trust to carry on their work without inference from outside. The policy changes 
in authority tools have, since the beginning of the 1970, been about decentralisation. 
The formal process of decentralisation started by the Commission Report, SOU 1974: 
53, and was repeated in the The Commission Report, SOU 1978:65, where an extensive 
decentralization was suggested. In addition to decentralisation, a third Commission 
Report, SOU 1980:5, introduced the concept of «Management by Objectives». 
However, the suggestions seem to be of a rhetorical kind, even though some limbering-
up changes happened. 
Minister of Education, Göran Persson got a specific mandate to radically reorganize 
the school system when he entered in the Ministry in 1989 (Haldén 1999). The mandate 
was based on a Commission Report, SOU 1988:20, which in turn relied on an experts 
report. However, it soon appeared that Persson intended to break with the line of the 
experts who suggested changes within the established and still, centralised system. In 
breaking with the established system two preconditions had to be fulfilled: firstly to put 
down the National Board of Education, secondly to decentralize the employment 
responsibility for teachers to the municipalities while introducing block grants. Due to 
the fact that the question had been on the agenda for more or less in forty years, this 
was not a new and radical suggestion. Still, the process ended in confrontations and a 
strike among the teachers supported by the Conservative parties. Nevertheless, the 
government succeed to get the decision through the parliament. The Proposition 
1989/90:41 concluded that the states regulation of teacher’s employment had come to 
an end.  
One year later, the Proposition 1990/91:18 changed the grant system into a sector 
based grant system. That decision ended the possibility for the state to regulate the 
volume of teaching at local level. Accordingly, the results was that municipals got a new 
role in the schools system as employers for teachers, as organisers of the school 
activities and as allocators of recourses to schools on the basis of block grants from the 
state. After the decentralization the National Board of Educations’ functions were no 
longer required. In 1990 it was decided to abolish the entire level of Regional Boards of 
Education (Proposition 1988/89:4). In 1991 the final decision on this issue was taken 
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and a new and much smaller National Agency for Education (Skolverket) was 
established (Proposition 1990/91:18). 
Incent ive tools  
There are clearly tendencies to introduce some markets forces in Swedish education 
policy. The number of independent schools has grown, but still independent schools 
constitute only between 2 and 3 per cent of all enrolments, most of them placed in 
urban areas. From the beginning of the 1990s there has been increased emphasis on 
competition and choice through supporting private providers of education and through 
various forms of ’vouchers’ and per capita financing.  
In addition, schools were encouraged specialize within the national curriculum in 
order to introduce competition also among the municipality schools. During the 
decentralisation teachers safety, represented by the standardization, was replaced by 
individualized agreements and wages. However, according to the teachers association, 
the municipalities have not compensated for this loss. A negotiation in 2000 suggested a 
part of the wages increase connected to a performance pay system. The teachers did not 
accept the agreement.  Due to the reductions in resources in school, the trust in the 
municipals policies seems to be lacking. 
Capaci ty  tools  
Like Norway Sweden are among the leaders in OECD when it comes to spending 
resources on education (OECD 2003). However, during the 1990s the level of 
expenditure has decreased. The teacher staffing levels, calculated as the number of 
teachers (adjusted to full-time posts) per 100 pupils, shows a decreasing trend from 
1991/92 to 2002/03. In the beginning of the 1990s there were 9 teachers per 100 pupils 
compared to 7, 9 in 2002/03. The total expenditure fell by almost 20% the same period, 
mainly due to the reduction in staffing levels (Skolverket 2003). It may be interesting to 
note that the reduction in staff and expenditures is concurrent with the decentralisation, 
as well as the slack of inspections and examination of schools activities, which took 
place from the beginning of the 1990s. After the introduction of a renewed 
concentration on quality, inspections and evaluation, we see that again the staff rates are 
increasing.     
The way the decentralization process was carried through may illustrate changes in 
the different actors’ capacities to influence in central decision making. The process was 
hidden to the public and to the actors representing the schools interests. Instead a few 
invited experts were designated to participate in the planning.  In addition, some of the 
participants in the expert group were nominated as leaders in the new National Agency 
for Education (Skolverket) (Haldén 1999)  
In order to improve capacity of the agency the plan was to quit the traditional way of 
acting and to shape creative thinking by recruiting new employers in the organisation. 
However, because of protests from the employers’ organisations, this was difficult to 
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achieve. The result was that 60 per cent of the employers of the National Agency were 
recruited from the former National Board (Skolöverstyrelsen).   
The municipalities’ roles in the decentralized model were to work out municipal 
plans, and follow up and assess the schools. In addition, they delegated responsibilities 
to schools. Schools have to develop their own local plans contenting how to achieve the 
knowledge standards which are decided at the central level.  The logic is that schools are 
to transform the general national ends into practical measurable terms. Accordingly, this 
distinct capacity tool is aimed at making the local level responsible in order to secure 
their own capacities as policy implementing bodies. These points are illustrated by the 
agreement between the Association of Municipalities (Kommunförbundet) and the 
Association of Teachers from 1995 on how to develop and secure quality in schools 
(Lauvdal 2000). The agreement involved a radical change in teachers pay and working 
time. The principle of equality in wages was excluded while the agreement opened up 
for local and individualised wages and working hours.  
Symbol ic  and hortatory  tools  
The long-standing tradition of unity, the stress on equality among schools and the 
strong tradition of centralism the Swedish system have been replaced by the 
introduction of instrumentalist rhetoric and practice in educational policy. In Sweden 
policy makers have gone further than their Norwegian counterparts in changing their 
symbolic tools as the vocabulary from the market spheres has been implemented to a 
greater extent.  Although still regulated, «competition», «privatization», «consumerism», 
«free choice», «effectiveness» and «goal orientation» are  vital elements in the Swedish 
education. The value shift toward quasi-markets in Sweden was largely driven by 
economic concerns (Miron 1993). There seems to be a shift from collectivism to 
individualism within the Swedish schools system, and increasingly education is regarded 
as a private rather than a public good.  
Learning tools  
Learning tools have played a significant role in the Swedish system and been an 
important instrument since decentralisation became an intentional issue in the 1960s. 
During the 1970s and 80s National Boards’ evaluation role has been challenged, and 
especially their role as both evaluator and responsibility body (Jacobsson and Sahlin-
Andersson 1995). In 1986 the question of evaluation was actualised. The National 
Board presented a suggestion on how to specify the objectives of the curriculum and 
accordingly on how to point out performance criteria that match policies and practices.  
The aim was to get a fully overview of the school situation. The National Board engaged 
researchers to participate in the evaluation, much as a buffer in case the implementation 
of the evaluation should fail. Due to the abolishment of the National Board, however, 
the smaller National Agency inherited the task of fulfilling the national evaluation in 
order to spell out objectives for the further development of schools.  
GOVERNANCE  IN  PRIMARY  AND LOWER SECONDARY  EDUCAT ION WORKING PAPER  17  -  2004  
  17
The evaluation was carried out in 1991 and 1992, but both the performing and the 
analyzing turned out to be complex and problematic (Jacobsson and Sahlin-Andersson 
ibid). In the reports the initial ambitions of presenting the schools as separate units were 
abolished and the data was presented mainly at the national level. In that way the 
national evaluation connected two problematic issues. In addition, the National Agency 
was not comfortable in taken over these tasks, which very well could give the 
impression of a centralistic and old fashioned body. According to Jacobsson and Sahlin-
Andersson, however, the National Agency made use of the evaluation in order to 
increase their legitimacy and credibility, presenting themselves as a serious organisation. 
Despite that the 1994 Curriculum downsized details, while emphasis shifted from 
control of input to control of output, the National Agency didn’t want to play the role 
of a controlling body. It concentrated on counselling and service in the expense of the 
evaluative task. Focus was on formulating objectives according to municipalities and 
schools responsibilities for organizing and implementing the objectives in the local 
setting.   
However, a new era of evaluation as a learning tool was started by the Governments’ 
order of a new document of objectives in 1996 which resulted in a Commission Report 
(SOU 1997:21). The obligation to report, due to the concept of Management by 
objectives was strengthened (Wahlström 2002). In the annual reports, received by the 
government, the National Agency had to explain that several municipalities had 
problems with their duty to follow up and evaluate the quality in schools. Accordingly, 
the government acted and strengthened the states control. A quality investigation 
committee was sat down leading to reassuming of the schools inspectors. The 
government gave the assignment to focus on conditions for performance in the schools. 
Thus, inspections were for the first time concentrated on quality (Skolverket 1998).  In 
addition, in 1997, the Ordinance on Quality Reports in the Education System (SFS 
1997) obliged schools and municipalities to report their quality situation each year. In 
line with suggestions in a Commission Report (SOU 1997:121) this is a part of a 
continuous follow-up and evaluation of the educational system. The quality reports aim 
to inform to which extent the educational objectives have been achieved, as well as the 
actions required locally in order to achieve the objectives not yet realized. However the 
local level seems to have problems assessing their own activity relatively to centrally set 
standards. A new Education Act was prepared in 2002. Among others the mandate was 
to sharpen the states supervision and to strengthen further the elements of Management 
of Objectives (SOU 2002:121).  
In 2003 another change was made to strengthen the National Agency for 
Education’s examination procedures. The development support activities were moved 
to a new authority, the National Agency for School Improvement. From now on The 
National Agency for Education is responsible for educational inspection, national 
follow-up and evaluation and reviewing curricula and grading criteria. 
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The English case 
Author i ty  tools  
Traditionally, the English state has only to a very limited degree interfered with primary 
and secondary education by use of legislation and reorganisation. Education policy were 
formulated and carried out by school owners and local education authorities together 
with the teacher professions in their daily work. However, the 1944 Education Act 
increased the role of English central government in education by establishing the first 
Ministry of Education with a member of government as its minister. The 1944 
Education Act provided for free, compulsory secondary education for all children up to 
the age of 15, but did not introduce a common secondary school for all. A tripartite, 
selective system of secondary schools was set up designed to meet varying aptitudes 
(Hudson and Lidström 2002). The so called dual system of maintained schools was 
retained with schools directly provided by the local education authorities (LEA) and 
voluntary schools that were mainly attached to churches, which received grants from the 
LEA. The Act did not deal with the great number of independent or other private 
schools. There was a consensus over education in the period after 1945 that lasted until 
the 1970s (Hudson and Lidström 2002).  
The Labour government legislated for universal comprehensive education in 1974, 
but the Conservative government elected in 1979 allowed grammar schools to continue. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s a series of Education Acts were passed to break the 
LEA monopoly (Whitty, Power and Halpin 1998). The central state now interfered in 
education introducing deregulating policy reforms.  The 1988 Education Reform Act 
involved a comprehensive and deep-going transformation of the education system. The 
education system was to become more subject to market forces and the balance of 
power between central government, local government and schools was changed 
profoundly (Riley 1990, cf. Hudson and Lidström 2002:38).   
The 1988 Act allowed existing schools to opt out of their LEAs and become grant-
maintained schools run by a governing body with increased powers in relation to 
admissions, finance and staffing, but still dependent on the central state and the national 
curriculum (Whitty et al 1998). The 1988 Act introduced, for the first time ever in 
Britain, a centrally controlled compulsory national curriculum. The National Curriculum 
is said to have changed the status of the curriculum from the ‘secret garden’ of an 
autonomous professional community detached from public scrutiny (Ranson 2003:459) 
to a ‘reign of terror’ (Hood et al 1999).  
The government increased its powers over local education through the introduction 
of the National Curriculum which consisted of both core subjects and foundation 
subjects. It was characterised by instrumentalism, commercialism and elitism (Kelly, 
1990, cf. Hudson and Lidström 2002:39). Because of strong criticism a revised version 
was introduced in 1995. Another consequence of the 1988 Act was that local authorities 
lost power through decentralization of responsibilities to schools and increased parental 
choice. The 1992 Education Act replaced the former HM Inspectorate of Schools by a 
non-Ministerial department, Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), to organize a 
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system of more rigorous and regular school inspections. By the mid-1990s it seemed 
likely that the LEAs would be abolished, but in the 1996 White Paper Self-Government for 
Schools, the Conservatives saw them carrying through functions which the schools could 
not perform themselves. 
Incent ive tools  
The incentive tools of the English education policy are tightly connected to a market 
forces philosophy introduced in the beginning of the 1980s. By permitting increased 
parental choice, introducing open enrolment and competition between schools requiring 
LEAs to publish examination results (Hudson and Lidström 2002:49), the school 
funding system was basically changed. Even though Prime Minister Major clearly 
expressed that the aim was that all publicly funded schools would be run as free self-
governing schools like the grant-maintained schools, the system of funding did not 
change very much during the 1990s. The market oriented competitive educational 
system developed in England is supposed to improve pupils’ performance. 80 per cent 
of each school’s budget is determined directly by the number and ages of its pupils 
(Whitty et al 1998). The per capita funding favours popular schools which attract many 
pupil applications and vice versa, it punishes schools which are undersubscribed 
(Gewirtz 2002). A performance pay system is introduced as an incentive to inspire the 
school teachers. Schools that are assessed to be failing may receive grants to improve 
performance. If the performances do not improve immediately, they might be closed. 
The incentive tools in English education are very important. They are used both as 
reward and punishment. 
Capaci ty  tools  
In England, the local education authorities were responsible to interpret the broad 
policies provided by the government. In accordance with the education acts passed in 
the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the funding system of publicly funded schools 
changed. Under the 1993 Education Act the Funding Agency for Schools (FAS) was 
introduced. FAS were given the power to take decisions affecting all schools, both 
within the local authority and the grant maintained sectors. The LEA’s role was 
diminished to estimating the total resources available to schools according to a centrally 
determined formulae, thus the LEA’s had little influence over how the resources should 
be utilized by the schools. First of all, the budget was to be allocated on the basis of the 
number of pupils, and the LEA was not allowed to earmark any resources. While the 
grant-maintained schools are funded directly from the state, the LEA allocates 85 per 
cent of their budget down to schools that are under LEA control. Most church schools 
are in the public sector too and they receive funding from LEAs (Whitty et al 1998). 
2001 figures on resources allocated on education show that Great Britain spent below 
the OECD average amount per pupil. The number of pupils per teacher in England is 
20 (OECD 2003). 
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Curriculum decision-making and pedagogy before the era of educational reforms in 
the 80s and 90s were largely entrusted to professionals on the ground (Whitty 1990, cf. 
Hudson and Lidström 2002). Ranson argues that recognition of the complexity of 
professional purpose and practice shaped the mode of accountability: «Public trust was 
afforded to the specialist knowledge of professionals and the necessary requirements of 
answerability could be fulfilled by delegating authority to heads, teachers, and advisors – 
only the trained eye could judge the quality of teaching and the pupil progress» (Ranson 
2003:464). The introduced local management of schools gave school governing bodies 
much greater managerial discretion, control over the school budget and the 
appointment and dismissal of staff. The governing bodies of each school became 
responsible for the main policy decisions within the schools, and they were encouraged 
to include business expertise to provide financial and managerial assistance (Hudson and 
Lidström 2002:40). 
The governing body has a range of duties and powers and a general responsibility for 
the conduct of the school with a view to promoting high standards of educational 
achievement including setting targets for pupil achievement, managing the school’s 
finances, making sure the curriculum is balanced and broadly based, appointing 
staff and reviewing staff performance and pay and more. School governors are drawn 
from different parts of the community, such as parents, the staff, the LEA, the 
community and other groups.  This is to ensure that the governing body has sufficient 
diversity of views and experience1. «The LEA’s function was reduced to largely one of 
planning the supply of school places; co-ordinating school networks; supplying optional 
support services and special educational needs; and allocating and monitoring budgets 
and performance standards» (Hudson and Lidström 2002:41–42). Hudson and Lidström 
claim that many of the changes contributed to undermine the role of local government 
in education (Hudson and Lidström 2002:42).  
Ofsted inspections have led to privatization of some education services and 
introduction of Education Action Zones which involve a partnership of business, 
community organizations, schools and LEAs. More and new actors are requested to 
take part in achieving higher standards and educate pupils for «the world of work» (cf 
the Ruskin speak, see below). The emphasis on diversity of provision, specialization and 
excellence with centrally steered testing, target setting and standard raising lead to a 
centralization of Education policies. The 1998 Education Act removed the grant-
maintained sector (although it did not remove the already established grant-maintained 
schools) and to an extent brought all types of publicly maintained schools back under 
LEA control. LEAs were given statutory responsibility to promote high standards in 
education and produce education development plans containing targets, methods, and 
strategies for monitoring and evaluating. LEAs are to cooperate with schools in this 
process, but the relationship is regulated by a code of practice issued by DfEE in 1999. 
This defines the general principles informing LEA-school relations. 
                                                 
1 The Ministry of Education and Skills: governor net www.governornet.co.uk 
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Symbol ic  and hortatory  tools  
The Labour Government elected in 1964 adopted a policy urging LEAs to abandon 
selective examinations and reorganise their schools into single status comprehensive 
schools (Hudson and Lidström 2002:34)2. The conservatives opposed the 
comprehensive schools and defended the selective system. A speech given by Labour 
Prime Minister, James Callaghan, at Ruskin College, Oxford, in 1976 stated that schools 
should prepare pupils for the world of work, reconsider the curriculum and teacher 
methods used. Prime Minister Callaghan thus initiated a debate about the standards and 
quality of public education in Britain and the speech represents an instrumental shift in 
English education policy. The major political opinion was that British economy was 
underperforming because of inadequate basic schooling provided by public authorities. 
In the attempt to raise the standards the emphasis was laid on increased competition 
and increased oversight in addition to reduce the professional control over schools by 
the teachers and the local authority administrators (Hood et al 1999). The initiative also 
encouraged greater involvement by parents and increase lays’ influence through school 
governing bodies. The 1988 Education Reform Act continued the process by making 
schools more responsive to market forces (Whitty 1990, cf. Hudson and Lidström, 
2002:50). The public as consumer was empowered at the expense of the professional 
provider and the accountability of education depended on support of consumers 
(Ranson 2003).  
The 1992 White Paper Choice and Diversity: A New Framework for Schools introducing 
schools’ ability to choose to specialize in, for example music, languages or technology. 
This was followed up by a scheme for Centres of Excellence for science or arts etc 
which schools could design for and receive extra funding. The idea has been developed 
further by the Labour government and at the beginning of 2000 there were 480 
specialist schools with plans to increase the number to 800 by September 2003. The 
most important market values which can be characterized as symbolic and hortatory 
tools are such as parental choice, academic ethos, equity (in opposition to equality), 
exclusivity, competition and performance (see for instance Hudson and Lidström 
2002:58 or Gewirtz 2002:54) 
Learning tools  
Recently, evaluation has become one of the most often uses learning tools. It has been 
stated that it is doubtful «if any more ambitious programme of school-by-school 
evaluation and review has ever been mounted anywhere in the world» (Wilcox and Gray 
1996:2, cf. Whitty et al 1998:20). The regime of public accountability in education was 
strengthened systematically during the new right period under Thatcher and Major. 
Accountability has become much more than an instrument or a component within 
governance of education. Accountability actual constitutes the system, claims Ranson 
                                                 
2Between 1960 and 1970, the number of comprehensive schools increased from 130 til 1145 (altogether more than 30 
per cent of the secondary-school pupils). 
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(2003). Assessment is integral to the National Curriculum introducing a system for 
testing pupils in state schools in a range of subjects at 7, 11, 14 and 16. The Department 
for Education and Skills publishes the tests result on their website:  «The Standards Site» 
and states for instance that result of the 2003 tests on Key Stage 2 and 3 are improving3. 
This demonstrates how testing and evaluating are used as learning tools and that the 
government finds the tools useful for its purpose to improve pupils’ performance. 
All National Curriculum matters are supervised by a central independent statutory 
body: the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority. Learning tools assume that agencies 
and target populations can learn about their behaviour. Another important change in 
public accountability in English education is that of strengthening the audit state from 
early 1990s. Improving the performance of schools was understood to be requiring 
meticulous specification of targets and tools that were expected that schools should 
fulfil. To measure performances tests and examination results would be published and 
monitored. An important effort by introducing Ofsted was to organize a system of 
more rigorous and regular school inspections and to judge the «failure» of schools. 
School inspections were to be undertaken by freelance teams. Inspections are now 
carried out according to a rigour defined framework. All failing schools must be turned 
round within two years, closed or given a fresh start. The Ofsted inspection system was 
supposed to increase relational distance and to reduce «professional capture» of the 
regulators by using lay inspectors and contracted – out inspection. The inspection is 
individualised directed to individual teachers and not just head teachers (Hood et.al 
1999). 
Discussion 
The outline of changes in policy tools in the three countries works as an illustration of 
fundamental rethinking on how to cope with public issues. The rethinking challenges 
governments and public sector by downsizing, privatization, devolving, decentralization, 
deregulation, delaying, contracting out and performance testing. Words as revolution 
has been used to characterize the fundamental change in government actions basic 
forms. That means a proliferation occurred in the tools used to address public problem 
(Salamon 2002). We will discuss the similarities and differences in the change of policy 
tools in Norway, Sweden and Britain to explore the underlying mechanisms of change. 
The question raised is how similarities in tools reflect convergence between the 
countries. Why does the use of the same tools imply different outcomes in the three 
countries? Thus the discussion will in turn form the basis for a further development of 
an analytical framework for comparing policy changes in different national contexts and 
practices.    
Apparently, the Norwegian and the Swedish education legislation policies follow the 
same direction, from strongly detailed regulations to ‘frame’ laws setting goals and 
objectives. The turning point appeared around 1990 in Sweden and a few years later in 
                                                 
3 http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/new/published/keystageresults/ 
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Norway. The English education legislation have gone in the quite opposite direction, 
from a minimum of state interference in local education governance to a radical shift by 
introducing a serial of education acts aimed at breaking the local education authorities 
power. Sweden and Norway have decentralised administrative and political decisions 
while England have been centralizing both curriculum and their control activities. All 
the same, seemingly during the last 15 years, there has been converges regarding the use 
of authority tools within the three countries. 
The marketization of English education policy has promoted the use of incentive 
tools in policy implementation. In achieving the main goal of higher standards, 
rewarding and punishment appear as very important instruments in the English market 
oriented system. Moreover, the competitive feature is further strengthened by the 
implementation of per capita funding. Sweden has introduced a regulated, sort of «quasi 
market» oriented education system. Here competition is promoted, although only to a 
limited extend, by factors such as parental choice, various forms of vouchers and per 
capita funding. The Swedish schools are defended against closure which is the ultimate 
punishment of the English schools. In Norway incentives are currently being 
introduced, but to a limited degree. Elements of performance pay and per capita 
funding, which are important incentive tools in England, cause massive teacher 
opposition in both Norway and Sweden 
The funding systems in Norway, Sweden and England differ in several ways. In 
Norway and Sweden there has been a change from earmarked state funding to block 
grants, implying that the allocation of economic resources is affected by local 
governments’ priorities. In England there has been a change from locally administered 
funding to funding per capita. Per capita funding has been introduced in Sweden too, 
but has not yet become decisive in the same way as in England. The professional 
knowledge of the teachers as a capacity tool in its own right has been challenged in all 
three countries. Professional knowledge is no longer entrusted per se, but based on 
pupils’ performances and assessment of teaching.  
The English education system is characterized by increasing tensions between the 
comprehensive values stated by the Labour party and the differentiation and elitist 
values encouraged by the conservatives. The conservative governments of the 80s and 
90s embraced both the traditional conservative values and the new liberal 
instrumentalist values. The Norwegian and Swedish unitary school system is based on 
comprehensive values. Nevertheless, these values are now challenged and transformed 
to match the instrumentalist values.  
The English inspection and evaluation system is characterised as one of the most 
ambitious scheme of schools inspection in the world. The regulation style is 
confrontational deterrence-oriented with «Regulators armed with heavier weapons and 
battery of published information designed to stimulate improvement through fear and 
shame as well as the more concealed competition of the past» (Broadbent and Laughlin 
1998, cf Hood et al 1999: 146). As highlighted by these characterizations, the English 
education learning tools are rather extreme and by no means comparable to learning 
tools in the other two countries.  Sweden, nonetheless, has introduced a relative 
extensive evaluation system too. In Norway, a long standing opposition has hindered 
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the introduction of a system similar to the Swedish. In the current situation testing and 
publishing of performance results are the main learning tools in Norway. 
 
Limitat ions in  tools  as  the uni t  of  
analys is   
Shifting the unit of analysis from policy programs or agencies to tools of public action 
we expect to move a step forward in exploring to which degree policy tools affect policy 
output. As a starting point, the use of the analytical scheme of tools is fruitful because it 
calls attention to the multiplicity of dimensions in policy change. However, a problem is 
that comparative studies of policy tools inevitably seem to conclude on convergence. At 
first glance, this also seems to be the case in our comparison. The outlined highlights 
point to a development of convergence in choice of policy tools. We find interesting 
similarities between these countries in terms of school reforms. The decrease in 
professional autonomy, standardization by national curriculum and centrally prescribed 
examination system are relevant characteristics in all the three countries. However, 
despite similarities in the use of tools, the outlining also points to different effects and 
implications of policy. Why has Sweden gone further than Norway in introducing 
incentive tools? How could it be that teachers have opposed and delayed the 
implementation of reforms in Norway, and to some degree in Sweden, but not success-
fully in England?  
Thus, we will point to two critical remarks concerning the use of tools as a 
dimension in comparisons. Firstly, we emphasize the significance of analysing the 
combination of tools related to the different categories. Secondly, following Clarke and 
Newman (1997) we will stress the instability caused by implementing the same 
instruments in different settings. Accordingly, we cannot assume linear effects of change 
merely based of specific choices of tools. Due to our first remark, the comparison above 
apparently points to convergence because all the three countries have taken steps 
toward marketization. Yet, as should be clear by now, England represents a radical 
marketing standard compared to Norway and Sweden. This underlines the need to 
analyze the specific mixture of tools in each country. In England, the conservatives’ 
values of elitism and differentiation strengthen the neo-liberalists instrumentalist values. 
In Norway and Sweden an inconsistency between social democratic comprehensive 
values and instrumentalist values seem to exist. An example of this inconsistency of 
tools might be the Norwegian experimenting with per capita funding without following 
up with open enrolment. Another example is that of implementing management by 
objectives without evaluating the outputs. In Sweden, the incentive tools are extensive, 
seemingly, but the authority tools limit the effect of marketization.  
In accordance to our second remark choice of tools is only one of several factors 
influencing policy output. As stated by Johnston (2003) the important issue is the 
relations between different dimensions that enables policies more than it determines. 
For our purpose in developing an analytical framework the dimensions of institution 
and practice will be important in explaining changes. This paper, though, is limited to 
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demonstrate the importance of revealing how, and the extent to which education 
policies in different contexts have integrated the different policy tools.   
 
The need to  contextual ize   
We will state that a potential convergence in policy output, deregulation and institutional 
autonomy not only depend on convergence in choice of tools, but also in the historical 
and institutional context to which the tools are being introduced. Changes in the choice 
of tools indicate institutional change. Certainly, there are different opinions on how 
standards of actions come into being, and how institutions change. The neo-institutional 
perspective on change relies on different theories. On the one side, the position of 
theoretical individualists promotes an actor-based institutionalism by putting the 
analytical focus on actors’ choices. The institutions decide the logic of exchange 
between the actors. When institutions change, actors do not change their preferences 
but their strategies (Rothstein and Steinmo 2002, Bogason 2000). On the other side, the 
collectivists emphasize the obligatory character of institutional norms, rules and 
routines, to an increasingly extent understood as «the logic of appropriateness» (March 
and Olsen 1989, Bogason 2000). Through rules and logic of appropriateness, political 
institutions can bring about order, stability and predictability on the one hand, and 
flexibility and adaptively on the other (March and Olsen 1989). More to the point, we 
consider the worldwide revolution in governmental tools as a manifestation of a shared 
logic of appropriateness. Public actions’ tools are increasingly the same across the 
countries. Moreover, they seem to reproduce. Thus, according to this perspective 
notions of appropriateness must have been changing in our three countries. An 
illustrative example is the change in the norms and routines of professional participation 
when making decisions and implementing school reforms in Norway and Sweden. The 
turning point was the radical break with centralism in Sweden in 1991. In Norway, the 
changes in norms and routines have been incremental during the 1990s. The changes 
carried through quite differently, but created similar outcome in the two Scandinavian 
countries. In England, a similar change could be identified as a shift from professional 
to public accountability (Ranson 2003). Even though the professional autonomy was 
limited to the local level it nevertheless constituted the education policies.    
A third perspective, historical institutionalism, works as a respond to the two 
perspectives just outlined (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). This perspective sees the 
outlooks of institution and preferences as framed by the past rather than viewing human 
choice as influenced by static institutional constraints. In addition, historical 
institutionalists state that changes occur in an interaction between interest driven forces 
and institutional framework. In addition, the perspectives vary in whether they emphasis 
internal dynamics or external events. Another characteristic of institutional change is 
whether change is incremental or appears as a radical change based on some sort of 
crisis or imbalance according to Krasner (1984). In Norway, the reforms seem to be 
characterized by «path-dependency» in an incrementalistic tradition, as administrative 
reforms usually do in Norway (Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). It might be claimed that 
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small changes in the direction of neo-liberalism have been made during the last 15–20 
years. Our hypothesis is that the strategy has been to convince the actors about the 
necessity of change as a mean to achieve both public and professional acceptance. The 
concept of «path-dependency» (Krasner 1984, Hall and Taylor 1996) reflects a situation 
where reforms are bounded by established norms, values and traditions that tend to 
resist radical institutional change. Although the last change in Norway, which gave the 
municipalities the total employer responsibility, appears as a radical and sudden reform, 
it is the result of a twenty-year struggle. In Sweden, transfers of power to the local level 
and the abolishing of the strong, central governing body represent quite a radical break 
from the established centralized school system. The concept of «punctuated 
equilibrium» (Krasner 1984) might characterize this peculiar form of policy change. The 
policy changes in England might be interpreted in terms of «punctuated equilibrium» 
too. The economical recession in the 1970s started the reform processes. The «Ruskin 
speech» has been characterized as the turning point. However, believing that 
institutional change is following from a shift in political power is not in accordance with 
institutional theory. Even though the changes appeared as radical, it can be argued that 
the reforms are following established values and traditions in line with the discussion on 
English hortatory and symbolic values above.     
The importance of  focus on pract ices  
So far, we have demonstrated the importance of the choice of tools and the institutional 
context in the explanation of policy change. In addition, we will stress a third element, 
namely the significance of the level of practices. Following Clarke and Newman (ibid) 
the different conceptualisations of change each represent the potential pitfall of 
assuming that changes signalize effectiveness. Assumptions on how managerial 
institutions develop optimal solutions or how myths and legitimating practises will be 
functional for organisational survival are subjects not to be taken for granted, but to be 
handled as empirical issues. Thus, institutional change takes place in actual practices and 
is therefore to be studied in its specific organisational setting. Here the concept of 
governance becomes relevant among other because it is based on an assumption that 
the process of change is shaped by the interplay of power and interest in a local 
institutional setting. The specific governing relations related to education policy are not 
necessarily part of the hierarchical – administrative structure. The 1992 Local 
Government Act in Norway deregulated and changed the conditions for governing 
relations. This has caused variations in local school governance (Homme 2004). This 
means that influence of different actors on the school policy arena varies between 
municipalities. Studies have shown that networks dominated by parents, teachers or 
schools managers in different alliances may be decisive in the implementation of policy 
(Helgøy and Homme 2003). In England a study performed by Birchall et al (1995, cf. 
Clarke and Newman 1997) concluded that even though managerial ideology shaped the 
government agenda and rhetoric of change substantially it did not form the central 
consciousness of school managers. In the English Grant Maintained schools, the system 
goals on efficiency and profit transformed into goals on teachers’ professional activity. 
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Another study underlines the high level of stress that preparation for tests and 
evaluations, shaped by the control regime, produces (Woods and Jeffrey 1998, cf. 
Gewirtz 2000). The growing number of teachers leaving the profession and severe 
recruitment problems are further indicators of this stress (Gewirtz 2000). Consequently, 
the teacher profession as the vital implementers of education policy is a vulnerable 
factor. In Sweden too, the practice level seems to be an important factor in the policy 
process. Even though it is claimed that apparently teachers have a high level of 
autonomy when it comes to input control, output control seems to be based on the 
relations between the professionals, local politicians and parents and other external 
sources (Klette and Carlgren 2000:382–83).               
Concluding remarks 
By focusing on change in the choice of tools in Norway, Sweden and England we have 
pointed out differences and similarities in education policy. Making comparisons while 
using the concept of tools as the primary analytical tool, implicates a potential danger 
for stressing convergence on behalf of divergence. The use of a tool doesn’t tell us how 
it is implemented in practice or in which institutional context the tool operates. If we 
want to explain policy changes and how they are implemented we need to broaden our 
analytical perspective. In this paper, we have discussed how neo-institutional theories 
broaden our understanding of educational reforms in the three countries. The 
discussion demonstrates that which tools are chosen and how they are implemented are 
affected by established and traditional core values within the different educational 
systems. All the same, the dynamics of change implicate breakdown of the traditional 
hierarchical governing structures. Accordingly, the term of governance with its focus on 
governing relations is a useful contribution to studies of policy changes.      
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